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The Role of Monotonicity in the Epistemic
Analysis of Strategic Games
Krzysztof R. Apt ∗† and Jonathan A. Zvesper‡
Abstract
It is well-known that in finite strategic games true common belief
(or common knowledge) of rationality implies that the players will
choose only strategies that survive the iterated elimination of strictly
dominated strategies. We establish a general theorem that deals with
monotonic rationality notions and arbitrary strategic games and al-
lows to strengthen the above result to arbitrary games, other rational-
ity notions, and transfinite iterations of the elimination process. We
also clarify what conclusions one can draw for the customary dom-
inance notions that are not monotonic. The main tool is Tarski’s
Fixpoint Theorem.
1 Introduction
1.1 Contributions
In this paper we provide an epistemic analysis of arbitrary strategic games
based on possibility correspondences. We prove a general result that is con-
cerned with monotonic program properties1 used by the players to select
optimal strategies.
More specifically, given a belief model for the initial strategic game, de-
note by RAT(φ) the property that each player i uses a property φi to select
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1The concept of a monotonic property is introduced in Section 2.
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his strategy (‘each player i is φi-rational’). We establish in Section 3 the
following general result:
Assume that each property φi is monotonic. The set of joint strategies
that the players choose in the states in which RAT(φ) is a true common
belief is included in the set of joint strategies that remain after the iterated
elimination of the strategies that for player i are not φi-optimal.
In general, transfinite iterations of the strategy elimination are possible.
For some belief models the inclusion can be reversed.
This general result covers the usual notion of rationalizability in finite
games and a ‘global’ version of the iterated elimination of strictly dominated
strategies used in [17] and studied for arbitrary games in [11]. It does not
hold for the ‘global’ version of the iterated elimination of weakly dominated
strategies. For the customary, ‘local’ version of the iterated elimination of
strictly dominated strategies we justify in Section 4 the statement
true common belief (or common knowledge) of rationality implies
that the players will choose only strategies that survive the iterated
elimination of strictly dominated strategies
for arbitrary games and transfinite iterations of the elimination process. Ra-
tionality refers here to the concept studied in [6]. We also show that the
above general result yields a simple proof of the well-known version of the
above result for finite games and strict dominance by a mixed strategy.
The customary, local, version of strict dominance is non-monotonic, so
the use of monotonic properties has allowed us to provide epistemic foun-
dations for a non-monotonic property. However, weak dominance, another
non-monotonic property, remains beyond the reach of this approach. In fact,
we show that in the above statement we cannot replace strict dominance by
weak dominance. A mathematical reason is that its global version is also
non-monotonic, in contrast to strict dominance, the global version of which
is monotonic. To provide epistemic foundations of weak dominance the only
currently known approaches are [10] based on lexicographic probability sys-
tems and [12] based on a version of the ‘all I know’ modality.
1.2 Connections
The relevance of monotonicity in the context of epistemic analysis of finite
strategic games has already been pointed out in [23]. The distinction between
local and global properties is from [2] and [3].
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To show that for some belief models an equality holds between the set of
joint strategies chosen in the states in which RAT(φ) is true common belief
and the set of joint strategies that remain after the iterated elimination of
the strategies that for player i are not φi-rational requires use of transfinite
ordinals. This complements the findings of [14] in which transfinite ordinals
are used in a study of limited rationality, and [15], where a two-player game
is constructed for which the ω0 (the first infinite ordinal) and ω0+1 iterations
of the rationalizability operator of [6] differ.
In turn, [13] show that arbitrary ordinals are necessary in the epistemic
analysis of arbitrary strategic games based on partition spaces. Further,
as shown in [11], the global version of the iterated elimination of strictly
dominated strategies, when used for arbitrary games, also requires transfinite
iterations of the underlying operator.
Finally, [16] invokes Tarski’s Fixpoint Theorem, in the context of what
the author calls “general systems”, and uses this to prove that the set of ra-
tionalizable strategies in a finite non-cooperative game is the largest fixpoint
of a certain operator. That operator coincides with the global version of the
elimination of never-best-responses.
Some of the results presented here were initially reported in a different
presentation, in [1].
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Strategic Games
Given n players (n > 1) by a strategic game (in short, a game) we mean
a sequence (S1, . . ., Sn, p1, . . ., pn), where for all i ∈ {1, . . ., n}
• Si is the non-empty set of strategies available to player i,
• pi is the payoff function for the player i, so pi : S1 × . . .× Sn→R,
where R is the set of real numbers.
We denote the strategies of player i by si, possibly with some superscripts.
We call the elements of S1×. . .×Sn joint strategies . Given a joint strategy
s we denote the ith element of s by si, write sometimes s as (si, s−i), and
use the following standard notation:
• s−i := (s1, . . ., si−1, si+1, . . ., sn),
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• S−i := S1 × . . .× Si−1 × Si+1 × . . .× Sn.
Given a finite non-empty set A we denote by ∆A the set of probability
distributions over A and call any element of ∆Si amixed strategy of player
i.
In the remainder of the paper we assume an initial strategic game
H := (H1, . . ., Hn, p1, . . ., pn)
A restriction of H is a sequence (G1, . . ., Gn) such that Gi ⊆Hi for all
i ∈ {1, . . ., n}. Some of Gis can be the empty set. We identify the restriction
(H1, . . ., Hn) with H . We shall focus on the complete lattice that consists of
the set of all restrictions of the game H ordered by the componentwise set
inclusion:
(G1, . . ., Gn)⊆ (G
′
1, . . ., G
′
n) iff Gi ⊆G
′
i for all i ∈ {1, . . ., n}
So in this lattice H is the largest element in this lattice.
2.2 Possibility Correspondences
In this and the next subsection we essentially follow the survey of [5]. Fix a
non-empty set Ω of states . By an event we mean a subset of Ω.
A possibility correspondence is a mapping from Ω to the powerset
P(Ω) of Ω. We consider three properties of a possibility correspondence P :
(i) for all ω, P (ω) 6= ∅,
(ii) for all ω and ω′, ω′ ∈ P (ω) implies P (ω′) = P (ω),
(iii) for all ω, ω ∈ P (ω).
If the possibility correspondence satisfies properties (i) and (ii), we call it
a belief correspondence and if it satisfies properties (i)–(iii), we call it a
knowledge correspondence.2 Note that each knowledge correspondence
P yields a partition {P (ω) | ω ∈ Ω} of Ω.
2Note that the notion of a belief has two meanings in the literature on epistemic analysis
of strategic games, so also in this paper. From the context it is always clear which notion
is used. In the modal logic terminology a belief correspondence is a frame for the modal
logic KD45 and a knowledge correspondence is a frame for the modal logic S5, see, e.g.
[7].
4
Assume now that each player i has at its disposal a possibility correspon-
dence Pi. Fix an event E. We define
E := 1E := {ω ∈ Ω | ∀i ∈ {1, . . ., n} Pi(ω)⊆ E}
by induction on k ≥ 1

k+1E := kE
and finally

∗E :=
∞⋂
k=1

kE
If all Pis are belief correspondences, we usually write B instead of  and
if all Pis are knowledge correspondences, we usually write K instead of .
When ω ∈ B∗E, we say that the event E is common belief in the state
ω and when ω ∈ K∗E, we say that the event E is common knowledge in
the state ω.
An event F is called evident if F ⊆F . That is, F is evident if for
all ω ∈ F we have Pi(ω)⊆ F for all i ∈ {1, . . ., n}. In what follows we shall
use the following alternative characterizations of common belief and common
knowledge based on evident events:
ω ∈ ∗E iff for some evident event F we have ω ∈ F ⊆E (1)
where  = B or  = K (see [18], respectively Proposition 4 on page 180
and Proposition on page 174), and
ω ∈ K∗E iff for some evident event F we have ω ∈ F ⊆E (2)
([4], page 1237).
2.3 Models for Games
We now relate these considerations to strategic games. Given a restriction
G := (G1, . . ., Gn) of the initial game H , by a model for G we mean a
set of states Ω together with a sequence of functions si : Ω→Gi, where
i ∈ {1, . . ., n}. We denote it by (Ω, s1, . . ., sn).
In what follows, given a function f and a subset E of its domain, we
denote by f(E) the range of f on E and by f |E the restriction of f to E.
By the standard model M for G we mean the model in which
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• Ω := G1 × . . .×Gn
• si(ω) := ωi, where ω = (ω1, . . ., ωn)
So the states of the standard model for G are exactly the joint strategies in
G, and each si is a projection function. Since the initial game H is given,
we know the payoff functions p1, . . ., pn. So in the context of H the standard
model is an alternative way of representing a restriction of H .
Given a (not necessarily standard) model M := (Ω, s1, . . ., sn) for a re-
striction G and a sequence of events E = (E1, . . ., En) in M (i.e., of subsets
of Ω) we define
GE := (s1(E1), . . ., sn(En))
and call it the restriction of G to E. When each Ei equals E we write
GE instead of GE .
Finally, we extend the notion of a model for a restriction G to a belief
model for G by assuming that each player i has a belief correspondence Pi on
Ω. If each Pi is a knowledge correspondence, we refer then to a knowledge
model . We write each belief model as
(Ω, s1, . . ., sn, P1, . . ., Pn)
2.4 Operators
Consider a fixed complete lattice (D, ⊆ ) with the largest element ⊤. In
what follows we use ordinals and denote them by α, β, γ. Given a, possibly
transfinite, sequence (Gα)α<γ of elements of D we denote their join and meet
respectively by
⋃
α<γ Gα and
⋂
α<γ Gα.
Let T be an operator on (D, ⊆ ), i.e., T : D→D.
• We call T monotonic if for all G,G′, G⊆G′ implies T (G)⊆ T (G′),
and contracting if for all G, T (G)⊆G.
• We say that an element G is a fixpoint of T if G = T (G) and a
post-fixpoint of T if G⊆ T (G).
• We define by transfinite induction a sequence of elements T α of D,
where α is an ordinal, as follows:
– T 0 := ⊤,
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– T α+1 := T (T α),
– for all limit ordinals β, T β :=
⋂
α<β T
α.
• We call the least α such that T α+1 = T α the closure ordinal of T
and denote it by αT . We call then T
αT the outcome of (iterating) T
and write it alternatively as T∞.
So an outcome is a fixpoint reached by a transfinite iteration that starts
with the largest element. In general, the outcome of an operator does not
need to exist but we have the following classic result due to [22].3
Tarski’s Fixpoint Theorem Every monotonic operator T on (D, ⊆ ) has
an outcome, i.e., T∞ is well-defined. Moreover,
T∞ = νT = ∪{G | G⊆ T (G)}
where νT is the largest fixpoint of T .
In contrast, a contracting operator does not need to have a largest fix-
point. But we have the following obvious observation.
Note 1 Every contracting operator T on (D, ⊆ ) has an outcome, i.e., T∞
is well-defined. 
In Section 4 we shall need the following lemma, that modifies the corre-
sponding lemma from [3] from finite to arbitrary complete lattices.
Lemma 1 Consider two operators T1 and T2 on (D, ⊆ ) such that
• for all G, T1(G)⊆ T2(G),
• T1 is monotonic,
• T2 is contracting.
Then T∞1 ⊆ T
∞
2 .
3We use here its ‘dual’ version in which the iterations start at the largest and not at
the least element of a complete lattice.
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Proof. We first prove by transfinite induction that for all α
T α1 ⊆ T
α
2 (3)
By the definition of the iterations we only need to consider the induction
step for a successor ordinal. So suppose the claim holds for some α. Then by
the first two assumptions and the induction hypothesis we have the following
string of inclusions and equalities:
T α+11 = T1(T
α
1 )⊆ T1(T
α
2 )⊆ T2(T
α
2 ) = T
α+1
2
This shows that for all α (3) holds. By Tarski’s Fixpoint Theorem and
Note 1 the outcomes of T1 and T2 exist, which implies the claim. 
2.5 Iterated Elimination of Non-Rational Strategies
In this paper we are interested in analyzing situations in which each player
pursues his own notion of rationality and this information is common knowl-
edge or true common belief. As a special case we cover then the usually
analyzed situation in which all players use the same notion of rationality.
Given player i in the initial strategic game H := (H1, . . ., Hn, p1, . . ., pn)
we formalize his notion of rationality using an optimality property φ(si, Gi, G−i)
that holds between a strategy si ∈ Hi, a set Gi of strategies of player i and a
set G−i of joint strategies of his opponents. Intuitively, φi(si, Gi, G−i) holds
if si is an ‘optimal’ strategy for player i within the restriction G := (Gi, G−i),
assuming that he uses the property φi to select optimal strategies. In Section
4 we shall provide several natural examples of such properties.
We say that the property φi used by player i is monotonic if for all
G−i, G
′
−i ⊆H−i and si ∈ Hi
G−i ⊆G
′
−i and φ(si, Hi, G−i) imply φ(si, Hi, G
′
−i)
So monotonicity refers to the situation in which the set of strategies of player
i is set to Hi and the set of joint strategies of player i’s opponents is increased.
Each sequence of properties φ := (φ1, . . ., φn) determines an operator Tφ
on the restrictions of H defined by
Tφ(G) := G
′
where G := (G1, . . ., Gn), G
′ := (G′1, . . ., G
′
n), and for all i ∈ {1, . . ., n}
G′i := {si ∈ Gi | φi(si, Hi, G−i)}
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Note that in defining the set of strategies G′i we use in the second argu-
ment of φi the set Hi of player’s i strategies in the initial game H and not
in the current restriction G. This captures the idea that at every stage of
the elimination process player i analyzes the status of each strategy in the
context of his initial set of strategies.
Since Tφ is contracting, by Note 1 it has an outcome, i.e., T
∞
φ is well-
defined. Moreover, if each φi is monotonic, then Tφ is monotonic and by
Tarski’s Fixpoint Theorem its largest fixpoint νTφ exists and equals T
∞
φ .
Finally, G is a fixpoint of Tφ iff for all i ∈ {1, . . ., n} and all si ∈ Gi,
φi(si, Hi, G−i) holds.
Intuitively, Tφ(G) is the result of removing from G all strategies that are
not φi-rational. So the outcome of Tφ is the result of the iterated elimination
of strategies that for player i are not φi-rational.
3 Two Theorems
We now assume that each player i employs some property φi to select his
strategies, and we analyze the situation in which this information is true
common belief or common knowledge. To determine which strategies are
then selected by the players we shall use the Tφ operator.
We begin by fixing a belief model (Ω, s1, . . ., sn, P1, . . ., Pn) for the initial
game H . Given an optimality property φi of player i we say that player i
is φi-rational in the state ω if φi(si(ω), Hi, (GPi(ω))−i) holds. Note that
when player i believes (respectively, knows) that the state is in Pi(ω), the
set (GPi(ω))−i represents his belief (respectively, his knowledge) about other
players’ strategies. That is, (Hi, (GPi(ω))−i) is the restriction he believes
(respectively, knows) to be relevant to his choice.
Hence φi(si(ω), Hi, (GPi(ω))−i) captures the idea that if player i uses φi to
select his strategy in the game he considers relevant, then in the state ω he
indeed acts ‘rationally’.
To reason about common knowledge and true common belief we introduce
the event
RAT(φ) := {ω ∈ Ω | each player i is φi-rational in ω}
and consider the following two events constructed out of it: K∗RAT(φ)
and RAT(φ)∩B∗RAT(φ). We then focus on the corresponding restrictions
GK∗RAT(φ) and GRAT(φ)∩B∗RAT(φ).
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So strategy si is an element of the ith component of GK∗RAT(φ) if si =
si(ω) for some ω ∈ K
∗RAT(φ). That is, si is a strategy that player i chooses
in a state in which it is common knowledge that each player j is φj-rational,
and similarly for GRAT(φ)∩B∗RAT(φ).
The following result then relates for arbitrary strategic games the restric-
tions GRAT(φ)∩B∗RAT(φ) and GK∗RAT(φ) to the outcome of the iteration of the
operator Tφ.
Theorem 1
(i) Suppose that each property φi is monotonic. Then for all belief models
for H
GRAT(φ)∩B∗RAT(φ) ⊆ T
∞
φ
(ii) Suppose that each property φi is monotonic. Then for all knowledge
models for H
GK∗RAT(φ) ⊆ T
∞
φ
(iii) For some standard knowledge model for H
T∞φ ⊆GK∗RAT(φ)
So part (i) (respectively, (ii)) states that true common belief (respectively,
common knowledge) of φi-rationality of each player i implies that the players
will choose only strategies that survive the iterated elimination of non-φ-
rational strategies.
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Proof.
(i) Fix a belief model (Ω, s1, . . ., sn, P1, . . ., Pn) for H . Take a strategy si
that is an element of the ith component of GRAT(φ)∩B∗RAT(φ). Thus we have
si = si(ω) for some state ω such that ω ∈ RAT(φ) and ω ∈ B
∗RAT(φ).
The latter implies by (1) that for some evident event F
ω ∈ F ⊆ {ω′ ∈ Ω | ∀i ∈ {1, . . ., n} Pi(ω
′)⊆RAT(φ)} (4)
Take now an arbitrary ω′ ∈ F ∩RAT(φ) and i ∈ {1, . . ., n}. Since ω′ ∈
RAT(φ), it holds that player i is φi-rational in ω
′, i.e., φi(si(ω
′), Hi, (GPi(ω′))−i)
holds. But F is evident, so Pi(ω
′)⊆ F . Moreover by (4) Pi(ω
′)⊆RAT(φ), so
Pi(ω
′)⊆ F ∩RAT(φ). Hence (GPi(ω′))−i ⊆ (GF∩RAT(φ))−i and by the mono-
tonicity of φi we conclude that φi(si(ω
′), Hi, (GF∩RAT(φ))−i) holds.
By the definition of Tφ this means that GF∩RAT(φ) ⊆ Tφ(GF∩RAT(φ)), i.e.
GF∩RAT(φ) is a post-fixpoint of Tφ. But Tφ is monotonic since each property
φi is. Hence by Tarski’s Fixpoint Theorem GF∩RAT(φ) ⊆ T
∞
φ . But si = si(ω)
and ω ∈ F ∩RAT(φ), so we conclude by the above inclusion that si is an
element of the ith component of T∞φ . This proves the claim.
(ii) By the definition of common knowledge for all events E we haveK∗E ⊆E.
Hence for all φ we have K∗RAT(φ)⊆RAT(φ) ∩ K∗RAT(φ) and conse-
quently GK∗RAT(φ) ⊆GRAT(φ)∩K∗RAT(φ).
So part (ii) follows from part (i).
(iii) Suppose T∞φ = (G1, . . ., Gn). Consider the event F := G1 × . . . × Gn
in the standard model for H . Then GF = T
∞
φ . Define each possibility
correspondence Pi by
Pi(ω) :=
{
F if ω ∈ F
Ω \ F otherwise
Each Pi is a knowledge correspondence (also when F = ∅ or F = Ω) and
clearly F is an evident event.
Take now an arbitrary i ∈ {1, . . ., n} and an arbitrary state ω ∈ F . Since
T∞φ is a fixpoint of Tφ and si(ω) ∈ Gi we have φi(si(ω), Hi, (T
∞
φ )−i), so by
the definition of Pi we have φi(si(ω), Hi, (GPi(ω))−i). This shows that each
player i is φi-rational in each state ω ∈ F , i.e., F ⊆RAT(φ).
Since F is evident, we conclude by (2) that in each state ω ∈ F it is
common knowledge that each player i is φi-rational, i.e., F ⊆K
∗RAT(φ).
Consequently
T∞φ = GF ⊆GK∗RAT(φ)
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Items (i) and (ii) show that when each property φi is monotonic, for all
belief models of H it holds that the joint strategies that the players choose in
the states in which each player i is φi-rational and it is common belief that
each player i is φi-rational (or in which it is common knowledge that each
player i is φi-rational) are included in those that remain after the iterated
elimination of the strategies that are not φi-rational.
Note that monotonicity of the φi properties was not needed to establish
item (iii).
By instantiating the φi’s with specific properties we get instances of the
above result that refer to specific definitions of rationality. This will allow
us to relate the above result to the ones established in the literature. Before
we do this we establish a result that identifies a large class of properties φi
for which Theorem 1 does not apply.
Theorem 2 Suppose that a joint strategy s 6∈ T∞φ exists such that
φi(si, Hi, ({sj}j 6=i))
holds all i ∈ {1, . . ., n}. Then for some knowledge model for H the inclusion
GK∗RAT(φ) ⊆ T
∞
φ
does not hold.
Proof. We extend the standard model for H by the knowledge correspon-
dences P1, . . ., Pn where for all i ∈ {1, . . ., n}, Pi(ω) = {ω}. Then for all ω
and all i ∈ {1, . . ., n}
GPi(ω) = ({s1(ω)}, . . ., {sn(ω)})
Let ω′ := s. Then for all i ∈ {1, . . ., n}, GPi(ω′) = ({s1}, . . ., {sn}), so by
the assumption each player i is φi-rational in ω
′, i.e., ω′ ∈ RAT(φ). By the
definition of Pis the event {ω
′} is evident and ω′ ∈ KRAT(φ). So by (1)
ω′ ∈ K∗RAT(φ). Consequently s = (s1(ω
′), . . ., sn(ω
′)) ∈ GK∗RAT(φ).
This yields the desired conclusion by the choice of s. 
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4 Applications
We now analyze to what customary game-theoretic properties the above two
results apply. By a belief of player i about the strategies his opponents
play given the set G−i of their joint strategies we mean one of the following
possibilities:
• a joint strategy of the opponents of player i, i.e., s−i ∈ G−i, called a
point belief ,
• or, in the case the game is finite, a joint mixed strategy of the opponents
of player i (i.e., (m1, . . ., mi−1, mi+1, . . ., mn), where mj ∈ ∆Gj for all
j 6= i), called an independent belief ,
• or, in the case the game is finite, an element of ∆G−i, called a corre-
lated belief .
In the second and third case the payoff function pi can be lifted in the
standard way to an expected payoff function pi : Hi×Bi(G−i)→R, where
Bi(G−i) is the corresponding set of beliefs of player i held given G−i.
We use below the following abbreviations, where si, s
′
i ∈ Hi and G−i is a
set of the strategies of the opponents of player i:
• (strict dominance) s′i ≻G−i si for
∀s−i ∈ G−i pi(s
′
i, s−i) > pi(si, s−i)
• (weak dominance) s′i ≻
w
G−i
si for
∀s−i ∈ G−i pi(s
′
i, s−i) ≥ pi(si, s−i) ∧ ∃s−i ∈ G−i pi(s
′
i, s−i) > pi(si, s−i)
In the case of finite games the relations ≻G−i and ≻
w
G−i
between a mixed
strategy and a pure strategy are defined in the same way.
We now introduce natural examples of the optimality notion.
• sdi(si, Gi, G−i) ≡ ¬∃s
′
i ∈ Gi s
′
i ≻G−i si
• (assuming H is finite) msdi(si, Gi, G−i) ≡ ¬∃m
′
i ∈ ∆Gi m
′
i ≻G−i si
• wdi(si, Gi, G−i) ≡ ¬∃s
′
i ∈ Gi s
′
i ≻
w
G−i
si
• (assuming H is finite) mwdi(si, Gi, G−i) ≡ ¬∃m
′
i ∈ ∆Gi m
′
i ≻
w
G−i
si
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• bri(si, Gi, G−i) ≡ ∃µi ∈ Bi(G−i) ∀s
′
i ∈ Gi pi(si, µi) ≥ pi(s
′
i, µi)
So sdi and wdi are the customary notions of strict and weak dominance
and msdi and mwdi are their counterparts for the case of dominance by a
mixed strategy. Note that the notion bri of best response, comes in three
‘flavours’ depending on the choice of the set Bi(G−i) of beliefs.
Consider now the iterated elimination of strategies as defined in Subsec-
tion 2.5, so with the repeated reference by player i to the strategy set Hi.
For the optimality notion sdi such a version of iterated elimination was stud-
ied in [11], for mwdi it was used in [10], while for bri it corresponds to the
rationalizability notion of [6].
In [15], [11] and [2] examples are provided showing that for the properties
sdi and bri in general transfinite iterations (i.e., iterations beyond ω0) of the
corresponding operator are necessary to reach the outcome. So to establish
for them part (iii) of Theorem 1 transfinite iterations of the Tφ operator are
necessary.
The following lemma holds.
Lemma 2 The properties sdi, msdi and bri are monotonic.
Proof. Straightforward. 
So Theorem 1 applies to the above three properties. In contrast, Theorem
1 does not apply to the remaining two properties wdi and mwdi, since, as
indicated in [3], the corresponding operators Twd and Tmwd are not monotonic,
and hence the properties wdi and mwdi are not monotonic.
In fact, the desired inclusion does not hold and Theorem 2 applies to
these two optimality properties. Indeed, consider the following game:
L R
U 1, 1 0, 1
D 1, 0 1, 1
Then the outcome of iterated elimination for both wdi and mwdi yields
G := ({D}, {R}). Further, we have wd1(U, {U,D}, {L}) and wd2(L, {L,R}, {U}),
and analogously for mwd1 and mwd2.
So the joint strategy (U, L) satisfies the conditions of Theorem 2 for both
wdi and mwdi. Note that this game also furnishes an example for non-
monotonicity of wdi since wd1(U, {U,D}, {L,R}) does not hold.
This shows that the optimality notions wdi and mwdi cannot be justified
in the used epistemic framework as ‘stand alone’ concepts of rationality.
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5 Consequences of Common Knowledge of Ra-
tionality
In this section we show that common knowledge of rationality is sufficient
to entail the customary iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies.
We also show that weak dominance is not amenable to such a treatment.
Given a sequence of properties φ := (φ1, . . ., φn), we introduce an operator
Uφ on the restrictions of H defined by
Uφ(G) := G
′,
where G := (G1, . . ., Gn), G
′ := (G′1, . . ., G
′
n), and for all i ∈ {1, . . ., n}
G′i := {si ∈ Gi | φi(si, Gi, G−i)}.
So when defining the set of strategies G′i we use in the second argument of
φi the set Gi of player’s i strategies in the current restriction G. That is,
Uφ(G) determines the ‘locally’ φ-optimal strategies in G. In contrast, Tφ(G)
determines the ‘globally’ φ-optimal strategies in G, in that each player i must
consider all of his strategies s′i that occur in his strategy set Hi in the initial
game H .
So the ‘global’ form of optimality coincides with rationality, as introduced
in Subsection 2.5, while the customary definition of iterated elimination of
strictly (or weakly) dominated strategies refers to the iterations of the ap-
propriate instantiation of the ‘local’ Uφ operator.
Note that the Uφ operator is non-monotonic for all non-trivial optimal-
ity notions φi such that φi(si, {si}, ({sj}j 6=i)) for all joint strategies s, so in
particular for bri, sdi, msdi, wdi and mwdi. Indeed, given s let Gs denote
the corresponding restriction in which each player i has a single strategy
si. Each restriction Gs is a fixpoint of Uφ. By non-triviality of φis we have
Uφ(H) 6= H , so for each restriction Gs with s including an eliminated strat-
egy the inclusion Uφ(Gs)⊆ Uφ(H) does not hold, even though Gs ⊆H . In
contrast, as we saw, by virtue of Lemma 2 the Tφ operator is monotonic for
bri, sdi and msdi.
First we establish the following consequence of Theorem 1. When each
property φi equals bri, we write here RAT(br) and similarly with Usd.
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Corollary 1
(i) For all belief models
GRAT(br)∩B∗RAT(br) ⊆ U
∞
sd
(ii) for all knowledge models
GK∗RAT(br) ⊆ U
∞
sd
where in both situations we use in bri the set of poinr beliefs.
Proof.
(i) By Lemma 2 and Theorem 1(i) GRAT(br)∩B∗RAT(br) ⊆ T
∞
br
Each best re-
sponse to a joint strategy of the opponents is not strictly dominated, so for
all restrictions G
Tbr(G)⊆ Tsd(G)
Also, for all restrictions G, Tsd(G)⊆ Usd(G). So by Lemma 1 T
∞
br
⊆ U∞
sd
,
which concludes the proof.
(ii) By part (i) and the fact that K∗RAT(br)⊆RAT(br). 
Part (ii) formalizes and justifies in the epistemic framework used here the
often used statement:
common knowledge of rationality implies that the players will
choose only strategies that survive the iterated elimination of
strictly dominated strategies
for games with arbitrary strategy sets and transfinite iterations of the elim-
ination process, and where best response means best response to a point
belief.
In the case of finite games Theorem 1 implies the following result. For the
case of independent beliefs it is implicitly stated in [8], explicitly formulated
in [21] (see [5, page 181]) and proved using Harsanyi type spaces in [9].
Corollary 2 Assume the initial game H is finite.
(i) For all belief models for H
GRAT(br)∩B∗RAT(br) ⊆ U
∞
msd
,
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(ii) for all knowledge models for H
GK∗RAT(br) ⊆ U
∞
msd
,
where in both situations we use in bri either the set of point beliefs or the set
of independent beliefs or the set of correlated beliefs.
Proof. The argument is analogous as in the previous proof but relies on a
subsidiary result and runs as follows.
(i) Denote respectively by brpi, brii and brci the best response property
w.r.t. point, independent and correlated beliefs of the opponents. Below φ
stands for either brp, bri or brc.
By Lemma 2 and Theorem 1 GRAT(φ)∩B∗RAT(φ) ⊆ T
∞
φ . Further, for all
restrictions G we have both Tφ(G)⊆ Uφ(G) and Ubr(G)⊆ Ubri(G)⊆ Ubrc(G).
So by Lemma 1 T∞φ ⊆ U
∞
brc
. But by the result of [19], (page 60) (that is
a modification of the original result of [20]), for all restrictions G we have
Ubrc(G) = Umsd(G), so U
∞
brc
= U∞
msd
, which yields the conclusion.
(ii) By (i) and the fact that K∗RAT(br)⊆RAT(br). 
Finally, let us clarify the situation for the remaining two optimality no-
tions, wdi and mwdi. For them the inclusions of Corollaries 1 and 2 do not
hold. Indeed, it suffices to consider the following initial game H :
L R
U 1, 0 1, 0
D 1, 0 0, 0
Here every strategy is a best response butD is weakly dominated by U . So
both U∞
wd
and U∞
mwd
are proper subsets of T∞
br
. On the other hand by Theorem
1(iii) for some standard knowledge model for H we have GK∗RAT(br) = T
∞
br
.
So for this knowledge model neither GK∗RAT(br) ⊆ U
∞
wd
norGK∗RAT(br) ⊆ U
∞
mwd
holds.
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